Books
The Practical Self
Forthcoming with Oxford University Press, 2024. We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects such as us must be related to an objective world. Philosophers in the twentieth century were less ambitious: self-conscious subjects must only think or experience the world as objective. The Practical Self argues that the answer to our question lies in a set of enigmatic remarks by the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. ‘One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning’, Lichtenberg writes. ‘To say cogito is already too much… To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.’ Lichtenberg is raising a puzzle here about our grounds for recognising ourselves as the agents of our thinking. Its solution is to understand that we have practical grounds to think of ourselves as intellectual agents. We are practical selves: intellectual agents who have distinctively practical grounds to recognise ourselves as such. And our faith in ourselves as practical selves is sustained through interaction with others. The argument of this book is that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking and that this faith is sustained by a practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others. Recent Articles
Strawson's Metacritique
Forthcoming in A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel and S. Heyndels (eds.) P.F. Strawson and His Legacy. submitted | On The Necessity of the Categories With Andrew Stephenson and A.W. Moore The Philosophical Review (2002) 131 (2):129–168. submitted | published Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision In M. Hopwood and S. Panizza (eds.) The Murdochian Mind (2022). submitted | published On Being Internally The Same With Matthew Parrott. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 1 (2021) submitted | published All Articles
Kant/Mind intersections
Strawson's Metacritique
Forthcoming in A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel and S. Heyndels (eds.) P.F. Strawson and His Legacy. submitted | Perception and Reflection Philosophical Perspectives (2017) 31: 131-152 . submitted | published Naive Realism in Kantian Phrase Mind (2017) 502: 529-578. submitted | published Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience European Journal of Philosophy (2016) 24 (3):946-969, in a special issue on P.F. Strawson's The Bounds of Sense. submitted | published Kant
On The Necessity of the Categories
With Andrew Stephenson and A.W. Moore The Philosophical Review (2002) 131 (2):129–168. submitted | published The Analytic of Concepts With Andrew Stephenson Forthcoming in S. Baiasu and M. Timmons (eds.) The Kantian Mind. submitted | Nonconceptualism, Hume's Problem, and the Deduction Philosophical Studies (2017) 174: 1687–1698. submitted | published Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds) Kant and the Philosophy of Mind (2017). submitted | published On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition. With Andrew Stephenson. In D. Schulting (ed) Kantian Non-Conceptualism (2016). submitted | published Kant on Perception: Naïve Realism, Non-conceptualism and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly (2014) 64: 1-19. submitted | published Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Kant-Studien (2013) 104: 277-300. submitted | published Is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose? Kantian Review (2010) 15: 118-37. submitted | published MindOn Being Internally The Same
With Matthew Parrott. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 1 (2021) submitted | published Unity and Objectivity in Strawson and Cassam Analytic Philosophy (2021) 62(1): 84-96. submitted | published Perception
How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.
With Craig French. Philosophical Quarterly (2019) 69:41-63. submitted | published On the Particularity of Experience. With Craig French. Philosophical Studies (2016) 173: 451-460. submitted | published Still Particular. With Craig French. Archived at PhilPapers May 2016. online | a reply to Ganson & Mehta Other Minds
Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.
In M. Parrott and A. Avramides (eds) Knowing Other Minds (2019). submitted | published Scepticism about Other Minds. In D. Machuca and B. Reed (eds) Skepticism: From Antiquity to Present (2018). submitted | published Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis (2015) 80: 173-183. submitted | published Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2011) 111: 353-373. submitted | published McDowell’s Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry (2011) 54: 277-292. submitted | published Other Minds and Perceived Identity. Dialectica (2009) 63: 219-230. submitted | published Iris Murdoch
Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision
In M. Hopwood and S. Panizza (eds.) The Murdochian Mind (2022). submitted | published Iris Murdoch on Art, Ethics and Attention. The British Journal of Aesthetics (2013) 53: 321-337. submitted | published Goldie on the Virtues of Art. The British Journal of Aesthetics (2009) 49: 75-81. submitted | published Social Psychology
More Dead than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients.
With Matthew Parrott and Joshua Shepherd. Philosophical Psychology (2016) 29: 84-95 submitted | published Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attribution. With Matthew Parrott. Philosophical Psychology (2015) 28: 1001-1011. submitted | published Reviews and Comments
Minding the Gap: Subjectivism and the Deduction.
Comments on Dennis Schulting, Kant's Radical Subjectivism Kantian Review (2018) submitted | Which Case Against Hume? Comments on David Landy's Kant's Inferentialism Critique. submitted | published Book Review: Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality Journal of Philosophy (2016) 113: 112-116 submitted | published In ProgressKant on Sensibility
With Andrew Stephenson. For the Oxford Handbook of Kant. |
Edited Books
Kant and The Philosophy of Mind
Edited with Andrew Stephenson. Oxford University Press, 2017. front matter | published The Oxford Handbook of Kant Edited with Andrew Stephenson. Under contract with Oxford University Press. contents page Encylopedia EntriesPeter Frederick Strawson
With Paul Snowdon. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy P.F. Strawson Oxford Bibliographies Online. Recent Talks
Luxembourg Mind Workshop. University of Luxembourg. June 2023.
A Resolute Reading of Descartes. Universität Hamburg. November 2022. Colloquium. Ben-Gurion University, Israel. April 2021. Departmental Seminar. University of Leeds. February 2021. Loxbridge Kant Series. University of Cambridge. March 2020. Lichtenberg's Puzzle. University of Warwick. February 2020. Strawson at 100. KU Leuven. November 2019. Visiting Speaker Seminar. University of Leipzig. November 2019. Irish Philosophical Club. March 2019. Workshop on Self-Knowledge. University of Stirling. December 2018. Departmental Seminar, University of Nottingham. October 2018. Moral Perception in Iris Murdoch. Oxford. April 2018. Departmental Seminar. University of Reading. February 2018. Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Southampton. January 2018. Self and World, 20 Years On. London. November 2017. Departmental Colloquium. University of Warwick. October 2017. Research Seminar. University of Edinburgh. September 2017. Perception and Autonomy. Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Leeds. July 2017. Aarhus Kant Workshop. Aarhus Universitet. Denmark. May 2017. Epistemology-led Metaphysics of Mind Workshop. University of Warwick. May 2017. The Metaphysics of Appearances. Ligerz. Switzerland. February 2017. Research Seminar. Durham University. February 2017. Philosophy of Education Research Seminar Series. UCL Centre for Philosophy of Education. February 2017. Kantian Acquaintance. Moral Sciences Club. University of Cambridge. November 2016. Expressive Knowledge of Other Minds. Joint Practical Knowledge workshop. Warwick University. July 2016. Kantian Acquaintance. Investigating Conscious Acquaintance. London. June 2016. Comments on Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality. Pacific APA. San Francisco. May 2016. Kantian Naive Realism. Perceptual Experience in Kant and German Idealism. University of Warwick. 19 March 2016. Kantian Naive Realism. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, 12 November 2015. Unity, Passivity, Objectivity. Koç University, Istanbul, 25 June 2015. Unity, Passivity, Objectivity. Kant on Introspection, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1-2 May 2015. |
