Books
The Practical Self
Oxford University Press, 2024. extract | published We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects must be related to an objective world. But many have worried about their starting points. ‘One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning’, the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg writes. ‘To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking. To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.’ Lichtenberg raises a question here about our entitlement to think of ourselves as the agent of our thinking. Sometimes thoughts strike us like lightning. When this happens, we are their patient. It is central to our self-conscious lives that this is the exception: we are first and foremost the agents of our thinking. What right do we have to think of ourselves as such? The Practical Self argues that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking. But faith can be undermined and it can be sustained. And this provides us with a connection to the world since our faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking is sustained by practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-conscious subjects must have faith in themselves as thinking agents and it is our relations to the others which sustain this faith. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others. Recent Articles
Kant on the Pure Forms of Sensibility
In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Kant (2024). submitted | published Strawson's Metacritique In A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel and S. Heyndels (eds.) P.F. Strawson and His Legacy (2023). submitted | published On The Necessity of the Categories With Andrew Stephenson and A.W. Moore The Philosophical Review (2002) 131 (2):129–168. submitted | published Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision In M. Hopwood and S. Panizza (eds.) The Murdochian Mind (2022). submitted | published All Articles
Kant/Mind intersections
Strawson's Metacritique
In A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel and S. Heyndels (eds.) P.F. Strawson and His Legacy (2023). submitted | published Perception and Reflection Philosophical Perspectives (2017) 31: 131-152 . submitted | published Naive Realism in Kantian Phrase Mind (2017) 502: 529-578. submitted | published Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience European Journal of Philosophy (2016) 24 (3):946-969, in a special issue on P.F. Strawson's The Bounds of Sense. submitted | published Kant
Kant on the Pure Forms of Sensibility
In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Kant (2024). submitted | published On The Necessity of the Categories With Andrew Stephenson and A.W. Moore The Philosophical Review (2002) 131 (2):129–168. submitted | published The Analytic of Concepts With Andrew Stephenson In S. Baiasu and M. Timmons (eds.) The Kantian Mind (2023). submitted | published Nonconceptualism, Hume's Problem, and the Deduction Philosophical Studies (2017) 174: 1687–1698. submitted | published Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds) Kant and the Philosophy of Mind (2017). submitted | published On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition. With Andrew Stephenson. In D. Schulting (ed) Kantian Non-Conceptualism (2016). submitted | published Kant on Perception: Naïve Realism, Non-conceptualism and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly (2014) 64: 1-19. submitted | published Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Kant-Studien (2013) 104: 277-300. submitted | published Is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose? Kantian Review (2010) 15: 118-37. submitted | published MindOn Being Internally The Same
With Matthew Parrott. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 1 (2021) submitted | published Unity and Objectivity in Strawson and Cassam Analytic Philosophy (2021) 62(1): 84-96. submitted | published Perception
How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.
With Craig French. Philosophical Quarterly (2019) 69:41-63. submitted | published On the Particularity of Experience. With Craig French. Philosophical Studies (2016) 173: 451-460. submitted | published Still Particular. With Craig French. Archived at PhilPapers May 2016. online | a reply to Ganson & Mehta Other Minds
Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.
In M. Parrott and A. Avramides (eds) Knowing Other Minds (2019). submitted | published Scepticism about Other Minds. In D. Machuca and B. Reed (eds) Skepticism: From Antiquity to Present (2018). submitted | published Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis (2015) 80: 173-183. submitted | published Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2011) 111: 353-373. submitted | published McDowell’s Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry (2011) 54: 277-292. submitted | published Other Minds and Perceived Identity. Dialectica (2009) 63: 219-230. submitted | published Iris Murdoch
Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision
In M. Hopwood and S. Panizza (eds.) The Murdochian Mind (2022). submitted | published Iris Murdoch on Art, Ethics and Attention. The British Journal of Aesthetics (2013) 53: 321-337. submitted | published Goldie on the Virtues of Art. The British Journal of Aesthetics (2009) 49: 75-81. submitted | published Social Psychology
More Dead than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients.
With Matthew Parrott and Joshua Shepherd. Philosophical Psychology (2016) 29: 84-95 submitted | published Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attribution. With Matthew Parrott. Philosophical Psychology (2015) 28: 1001-1011. submitted | published Reviews and Comments
Minding the Gap: Subjectivism and the Deduction.
Comments on Dennis Schulting, Kant's Radical Subjectivism Kantian Review (2018) submitted | published Which Case Against Hume? Comments on David Landy's Kant's Inferentialism Critique. submitted | published Book Review: Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality Journal of Philosophy (2016) 113: 112-116 submitted | published |
Edited Books
The Oxford Handbook of Kant
Edited with Andrew Stephenson. Oxford University Press. 2024. contents page | published Kant and The Philosophy of Mind Edited with Andrew Stephenson. Oxford University Press, 2017. front matter | published Encylopedia EntriesPeter Frederick Strawson
With Paul Snowdon. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy P.F. Strawson Oxford Bibliographies Online. In ProgressIris Murdoch on Privacy, Perfection, and the Philosophy of Mind
For a volume on The Soveriegnty of Good at 50. |
