ANIL GOMES
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The Practical Self
Oxford University Press, 2024.
extract | published

We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects must be related to an objective world. But many have worried about their starting points. ‘One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning’, the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg writes. ‘To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking. To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.’ Lichtenberg raises a question here about our entitlement to think of ourselves as the agent of our thinking. Sometimes thoughts strike us like lightning. When this happens, we are their patient. It is central to our self-conscious lives that this is the exception: we are first and foremost the agents of our thinking. What right do we have to think of ourselves as such? The Practical Self argues that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking. But faith can be undermined and it can be sustained. And this provides us with a connection to the world since our faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking is sustained by practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-conscious subjects must have faith in themselves as thinking agents and it is our relations to the others which sustain this faith. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others.

Recent Articles


Kant on the Pure Forms of Sensibility
In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Kant (2024).
submitted | published

Strawson's Metacritique
In
A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel and S. Heyndels (eds.) P.F. Strawson and His Legacy (2023). submitted | published

On The Necessity of the Categories
With Andrew Stephenson and A.W. Moore
The Philosophical Review (2002) 
131 (2):129–168. submitted | published

Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision
In M. Hopwood and S. Panizza (eds.) The Murdochian Mind (2022). submitted | published


All Articles


Kant/Mind intersections

Strawson's Metacritique
In
A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel and S. Heyndels (eds.) P.F. Strawson and His Legacy (2023). submitted | published

Perception and Reflection
Philosophical Perspectives (2017) 31: 131-152 . submitted | published

Naive Realism in Kantian Phrase
Mind (2017)
502: 529-578. submitted | published

Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience
European Journal of Philosophy (2016) 
24 (3):946-969, in a special issue on P.F. Strawson's The Bounds of Sense. submitted | published

Kant

Kant on the Pure Forms of Sensibility
In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Kant (2024).
submitted | published

On The Necessity of the Categories
With Andrew Stephenson and A.W. Moore
The Philosophical Review (2002) 
131 (2):129–168. submitted | published

The Analytic of Concepts
With Andrew Stephenson
In
S. Baiasu and M. Timmons (eds.) The Kantian Mind (2023). submitted | published

Nonconceptualism, Hume's Problem, and the Deduction
Philosophical Studies (2017) 174:
1687–1698. submitted | published

Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds) Kant and the Philosophy of Mind (2017). submitted | published

On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition.
With Andrew Stephenson. In D. Schulting (ed) Kantian Non-Conceptualism (2016). submitted | published

Kant on Perception: Naïve Realism, Non-conceptualism and the B-Deduction.
Philosophical Quarterly (2014) 64: 1-19. submitted | published

Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience.
Kant-Studien (2013) 104: 277-300. submitted | published

Is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose?
Kantian Review (2010) 15: 118-37. submitted | published

Mind

On Being Internally The Same
With Matthew Parrott. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 1 (2021) submitted | published

Unity and Objectivity in Strawson and Cassam
Analytic Philosophy (2021) 62(1): 84-96. submitted | published

Perception

How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.
With Craig French. Philosophical Quarterly (2019) 69:41-63. submitted | published

On the Particularity of Experience.
With Craig French. Philosophical Studies (2016) 173: 451-460. submitted | published


Still Particular. With Craig French. Archived at PhilPapers May 2016. online | a reply to Ganson & Mehta

Other Minds

Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.
In M. Parrott and A. Avramides (eds) Knowing Other Minds (2019). submitted
| published

Scepticism about Other Minds.
In D. Machuca and B. Reed (eds) Skepticism: From Antiquity to Present (2018). submitted | published

Testimony and Other Minds.
Erkenntnis (2015) 80: 173-183. submitted | published

Is There a Problem of Other Minds?
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2011) 111: 353-373. submitted | published

McDowell’s Disjunctivism and Other Minds.
Inquiry (2011) 54: 277-292. submitted | published

Other Minds and Perceived Identity.
Dialectica (2009) 63: 219-230. submitted | published

Iris Murdoch

Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision
In M. Hopwood and S. Panizza (eds.) The Murdochian Mind (2022). submitted | published


Iris Murdoch on Art, Ethics and Attention.
The British Journal of Aesthetics (2013) 53: 321-337. submitted | published

Goldie on the Virtues of Art.
The British Journal of Aesthetics (2009) 49: 75-81. submitted | published

Social Psychology

More Dead than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients.
With Matthew Parrott and Joshua Shepherd. Philosophical Psychology (2016) 29: 84-95 submitted | published

Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attribution.

With Matthew Parrott. Philosophical Psychology (2015) 28: 1001-1011. submitted | published

Reviews and Comments

Minding the Gap: Subjectivism and the Deduction.
Comments on Dennis Schulting, Kant's Radical Subjectivism
Kantian Review (2018) submitted | published

Which Case Against Hume?
Comments on David Landy's Kant's Inferentialism
Critique. submitted | published


Book Review: Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality
Journal of Philosophy (2016) 113: 112-116 submitted | published

Edited Books


The Oxford Handbook of Kant
Edited with Andrew Stephenson. Oxford University Press. 2024.
contents page | published

Kant and The Philosophy of Mind

Edited with Andrew Stephenson. Oxford University Press, 2017.
front matter
| published

Encylopedia Entries


Peter Frederick Strawson
With Paul Snowdon. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

P.F. Strawson
Oxford Bibliographies Online.

In Progress


Iris Murdoch on Privacy, Perfection, and the Philosophy of Mind
For a volume on The Soveriegnty of Good at 50.
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  • About
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