Nina Chua. Lavender (2011).
My research interests cluster around the following topics.
1. I’m currently working on a project about the connections between self-consciousness and objectivity. This comes out of an interest in Kant and the Kantian tradition. Some early work from this project is in a paper on Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense.
2. On Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, I’ve published papers on the Transcendental Deduction, the relation of the Deduction to claims about the nature of intuition (1, 2), and the relation of intuition to cognition. Andrew Stephenson and I edited a collection on Kant and the Philosophy of Mind, to which I contributed a chapter on Kant, the philosophy of mind, and twentieth-century analytic philosophy. And we are currently editing the Oxford Handbook of Kant.
3. I’m interested in the nature of perception. Sometimes this interest draws on Kant, as in my papers on naïve realism in Kantian phrase and on the role that transcendental arguments can play in the philosophy of perception. And sometimes it doesn't. Craig French and I have written some papers setting out and defending a form of naïve realism (1, 2, 3), which we hope to extend in future work.
4. I’ve written some things on the problem of other minds. A recent paper defends the idea that we have non-inferential and non-perceptual ways of knowing about others’ minds; an older paper defends a role for testimony in our coming to know about others’ minds. And I've written papers on the epistemological and conceptual problems of other minds.
5. I have a longstanding interest in the work of the wonderful Iris Murdoch (see here and here), and will be teaching a graduate class on her work in the near future.
I have a soft spot for a certain kind of twentieth-century English philosophy: J.L. Austin; Iris Murdoch; Anthony Kenny; P.F. Strawson; John McDowell. My ideal philosophy of mind course begins with chapter 1 of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. My actual Kant course begins with Rorty.
1. I’m currently working on a project about the connections between self-consciousness and objectivity. This comes out of an interest in Kant and the Kantian tradition. Some early work from this project is in a paper on Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense.
2. On Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, I’ve published papers on the Transcendental Deduction, the relation of the Deduction to claims about the nature of intuition (1, 2), and the relation of intuition to cognition. Andrew Stephenson and I edited a collection on Kant and the Philosophy of Mind, to which I contributed a chapter on Kant, the philosophy of mind, and twentieth-century analytic philosophy. And we are currently editing the Oxford Handbook of Kant.
3. I’m interested in the nature of perception. Sometimes this interest draws on Kant, as in my papers on naïve realism in Kantian phrase and on the role that transcendental arguments can play in the philosophy of perception. And sometimes it doesn't. Craig French and I have written some papers setting out and defending a form of naïve realism (1, 2, 3), which we hope to extend in future work.
4. I’ve written some things on the problem of other minds. A recent paper defends the idea that we have non-inferential and non-perceptual ways of knowing about others’ minds; an older paper defends a role for testimony in our coming to know about others’ minds. And I've written papers on the epistemological and conceptual problems of other minds.
5. I have a longstanding interest in the work of the wonderful Iris Murdoch (see here and here), and will be teaching a graduate class on her work in the near future.
I have a soft spot for a certain kind of twentieth-century English philosophy: J.L. Austin; Iris Murdoch; Anthony Kenny; P.F. Strawson; John McDowell. My ideal philosophy of mind course begins with chapter 1 of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. My actual Kant course begins with Rorty.
